Offi cial purchases of foreign assets-a broad defi nition of currency intervention-are strongly correlated with current account (trade) imbalances. Causality runs in both directions, but statistical analysis using instrumental variables reveals that the eff ect of offi cial asset purchases on current accounts is very large. A country's current account balance increases between 60 and 100 cents for each dollar spent on intervention. Th is is a much larger eff ect than is widely assumed. Th ese results raise serious questions about the effi ciency of international fi nancial markets.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current account (or trade) imbalances grew to record levels just before the global fi nancial crisis of 2008. At the same time purchases of foreign assets by governments also reached record levels. Over the past fi ve years, both current account imbalances and offi cial asset purchases have retreated somewhat, but remain at historically high levels. An obvious question is whether there is a causal relation between these phenomena. Figure 1 shows a striking correlation between aggregate current account balances and aggregate net offi cial fi nancial fl ows of countries with large stocks of offi cial foreign assets as of 2010.
Few people would say that the correlation in fi gure 1 is a coincidence, but some have argued that the causality runs from current accounts to offi cial asset accumulation. In their view, governments in these countries chose to accumulate foreign assets because they had current account surpluses. Th at may be, but it is also possible that governments chose to make large purchases of foreign assets in order to prevent currency appreciation that would have kept current accounts close to balance. Th e key question is whether the large current account surpluses would have occurred, or would have been as persistent, if governments had not bought any foreign assets.
Th is paper fi nds that the large current account imbalances shown in fi gure 1 probably would not have occurred, and certainly would not have persisted, without massive offi cial net purchases of foreign assets. Th is
result suggests that international fi nancial markets are not very effi cient at equalizing rates of return across countries. Th is result also suggests that the problem of global current account imbalances may be more readily corrected through policy actions than is generally believed. C. Fred Bergsten and I explore the implications of the latter point in a recent policy brief (Bergsten and Gagnon 2012) .
II. A MODEL

Defi nitions
Current accounts and fi nancial fl ows are linked by a fundamental accounting identity. In the absence of measurement error, the current account exactly equals the sum of net offi cial and net private fi nancial fl ows. Th is is because any net imbalance of current transactions (trade and income) must be fi nanced by an equal and off setting imbalance of fi nancial transactions. Th is relationship is known as the balance of payments (BOP) identity. Errors and omissions in measurement prevent the BOP identity from holding exactly in the data. However, as is shown in the next section, errors and omissions are relatively small. 
Z (vector) Exogenous variables for NOF (instruments)
Exogenous variables, X, for CAB and NPF include the cyclically adjusted fi scal balance, the level of economic development, population aging, capital controls, and other factors. NOF may respond in part to the same factors that infl uence CAB and NPF, but we assume that there are other variables, Z, that infl uence NOF independently of factors that drive CAB and NPF. Candidates for Z include, for example, the lagged ratios of the stock of offi cial foreign assets (reserves) to imports or to external short-term debt.
Semi-Structural Model
A structural economic model is based on economic theory and may include eff ects of endogenous variables on each other subject to restrictions implied by the theory. A reduced form model relates each endogenous variable to the exogenous variables and typically does not impose any theoretical restrictions.
Th e model presented here is semi-structural. It expresses the endogenous variables in terms of exogenous variables with one exception, the response of NPF to NOF. Th ere are two advantages to this approach.
First, it imposes relatively simple theoretical assumptions on the data. Second, it does not require data on the real exchange rate and the real rate of return, which are important elements of any structural model of these variables. Th e real exchange rate is not observed except in the form of an index that is not comparable across countries. 1 In addition, it is likely that available measures of the real exchange rate and the real rate of return do not fully capture movements in relative prices and rates of return that are perceived by participants in the markets for goods, services, and fi nance. Appendix 1 develops a fully structural model that is used to interpret and support the approach taken here.
(1) NOF = A × X + × u2 + B × Z + u1 + v1
(2) NPF =  × NOF T + C × X + u2 + v2
Individual capital letters denote vectors of coeffi cients and variables. Lower case letters and the endogenous variables CAB, NOF, and NPF are scalars. Because governments may use NOF to stabilize their exchange rates, equation 1 allows NOF to react to the same factors that drive NPF, including the unobserved random error in NPF, u2. In addition, NOF responds to the instruments, Z, and there is an unobserved error, u1, and a measurement error, v1.
1. Th e Penn World Table attempts to measure the real exchange rate in a form that is comparable across countries, at least from the point of view of consumers, but it is not clear how successful the attempt is (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2012) . Moreover, other unobserved factors, such as implicit trade barriers and diff erences in market competition, have important eff ects on the concept of the real exchange rate that matters for international trade and fi nance.
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Equation 2 is the key equation of the paper. NPF responds to all factors that aff ect fi nancial fl ows directly as well as factors that operate indirectly through trade and income fl ows in the CAB. Th ese are summarized in the vector X and the error u2. Th e question of interest is how NPF responds to NOF, as captured by the coeffi cient . If  = 0, then NOF has a large eff ect on CAB, as shown in the BOP identity. If  = -1, then NPF fully off sets whatever actions governments take and NOF has no eff ect on CAB.
Appendix 1 demonstrates in a structural model that the extreme values of  = -1 and 0 correspond to the cases of fully effi cient fi nancial markets and no fi nancial arbitrage, respectively. In other words, when rates of return are fully equalized across countries,  = -1, and when fi nancial markets do not respond at all to diff erentials in rates of return across countries,  = 0. Th e goal of this paper is to estimate.
First-Stage Regression
Because NOF is endogenous with respect to CAB and NPF, regressing NPF on NOF as in equation 2 yields a biased estimate of . Appendix 1 explores the nature of the bias. If the shock to NPF, u2, arises primarily from the fi nancial sector, then  is biased downward (more negative). If the shock to NPF arises primarily from the trade sector, then may be biased either upward or downward, depending on the values of the underlying parameters. Th e empirical results below demonstrate the importance of downward bias inarising from fi nancial shocks.
A two-stage method is required to obtain an unbiased estimate of  Th e fi rst stage is to regress NOF on X and Z as suggested by equation 1. Th e fi tted value, NÔF, is displayed in equation 3. It is important to note that the estimate of  in equation 5 is equal to the coeffi cient on NÔF minus 1. Th e regression results reported in this paper display estimates of . But the question of broader interest
is, "what is the eff ect of currency intervention on current account (trade) imbalances?" Th e eff ect of NOF on the CAB is 1+.
Exogenous Variables: X
Elements of X commonly used in previous studies include lagged net foreign assets, the fi scal balance, per capita GDP relative to that in the United States, the trend growth rate of GDP, the population growth rate, levels or changes of age dependency ratios, and net oil or net energy exports (Chinn and Prasad 2003 , Gruber and Kamin 2007 , Chinn and Ito 2008 , Cheung, Furceri, and Rusticelli 2010 , Gagnon 2012 , IMF 2012 , and Bayoumi and Saborowski 2012 . In this paper, the included X variables are cyclically adjusted general government net lending (FISCAL), lagged net private foreign assets (NPFA), lagged per capita GDP relative to that of the United States in PPP terms (YPPP), a forecast of GDP growth over the next fi ve years (YFORE), lagged public spending on health (HEALTH), net energy exports (ENERGY), the expected change over the next 20 years in the ratio of elderly to working-age population (AGING), and a measure of capital controls (CAPCON). 2 A full set of time dummies is added to allow for common movements in current accounts refl ecting the global current account discrepancy. Time dummies also allow for a generalized spillover of the eff ects of NOF on the CABs of all countries equally.
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All variables are defi ned in appendix 2.
Exogenous Variables (Instruments): Z
Th ere are two sets of instruments used in this paper, labeled "between" and "within." Th e between instruments allow for NOF policies to diff er across countries in an unrestricted way. Th e between instruments consist of dummy variables for each country (also known as country fi xed eff ects in a panel regression framework) plus the country dummies multiplied by lagged gross offi cial assets divided by imports. 4 Th e between instruments also include the ratio of net energy exports to GDP only for countries and time periods in which there exists an explicit public-sector natural resource sovereign wealth fund (OIL_SWF).
Th e latter variable is not interacted with the country dummies. Th e between instruments allow each country to have a diff erent desired stock of reserves. Th ey utilize the cross-country information in the data while omitting high-frequency fl uctuations in NOF over time that might be driven by shocks to NPF.
Th e within instruments also allow for NOF policies to diff er across countries, but in a much more restricted way that does not require country dummies. Th e within instruments introduce country variation in policies via interacted variables. Th e interacted variables allow eff ects to vary according to a country's stage of development or its history of fi nancial crises. Th e within instruments are:
 the lagged ratio of gross offi cial foreign assets to imports, to capture deviations of reserves from some desired level based on months of imports;
the lagged fi ve-year moving average of repayments of IMF credit relative to GDP, to capture a desire to build up net offi cial assets in the aftermath of a fi nancial or currency crisis;
 the ratio of net energy exports to GDP only for countries and time periods in which there exists an explicit public-sector natural resource sovereign wealth fund (OIL_SWF);
 lagged external short-term debt relative to GDP, to capture the Greenspan-Guidotti rule;
 lagged external public and publicly guaranteed debt relative to GDP, which may restrict the usability of gross foreign offi cial assets in a crisis;
 lagged net offi cial assets relative to GDP, to capture reinvestment of earnings on offi cial assets (this proved not to be highly collinear with the fi rst instrument and the debt stocks);
 the fi rst instrument multiplied by relative PPP GDP per capita, to capture diff erent desired reserves levels for rich and poor countries; and  the fi rst instrument multiplied by the lagged moving average of repayments of IMF credit, to capture any nonlinearity in the relationship between recent crises and desired offi cial assets.
III. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS Data
Th e baseline dataset consists of observations on 40 economies over 25 years from 1986 through 2010.
Th ese are the same countries and years examined in IMF (2012) except that the euro area is treated as a single economy. 5 Th e alternate dataset consists of observations on all available countries (115) over the same years. Th e baseline dataset includes relatively larger and wealthier countries, whereas the alternate dataset is dominated by smaller and poorer countries. In the alternate dataset, euro area members are treated as separate economies. Th ere are many missing observations for the early years of the sample, especially in the alternate dataset. Some variables have fewer missing observations than others; thus, the number of observations used in the regressions varies across specifi cations.
5. Diff erences in NOF are meaningless within a currency union, and members of the euro area had tightly linked exchange rate and monetary policies even before the start of the union in 1999. Regression fi t is uniformly better with the euro area treated as a single economy than as separate economies.
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Analysis proceeds both at the annual frequency and at the fi ve-year frequency. Most studies in this area have used non-overlapping fi ve-year averages of the data to reduce the eff ects of dynamic adjustment and to focus on medium-term determinants of CABs. (1) shocks to CAB are larger than other shocks (this is supported by the standard deviations); (2) governments aggressively attempt to stabilize their real exchange rates through accommodative purchases of foreign assets (NOF); and (3) NPF would have supported the changes in CAB even in the absence of NOF. But the latter assumption implies that the CAB shocks should not have had much eff ect on the real exchange rate, in which case governments would not have felt compelled to intervene. A more plausible interpretation is that the fi rst two assumptions are correct but the third is not. Th is means that if governments had not used NOF aggressively to stabilize their exchange rates, their CABs would not have deviated so much across countries. Note also that these data are averages over 25 years; this suggests that governments are not stabilizing their exchange rates around equilibrium levels, but rather are perpetuating CAB imbalances through NOF imbalances.
Th e fi nal section shows correlations within countries over time. On this measure, NPF is more strongly correlated with CAB than NOF is. NPF also has the largest volatility and CAB the lowest, with NOF in between. Note, however, the large negative correlation between NOF and NPF. A plausible interpretation of this section is that (1) volatility within countries over time is driven by NPF; (2) NOF responds to partially off set the eff ect of these volatile private fl ows on the real exchange rate; and (3) the partial NOF response damps movements in the CAB that would otherwise occur, which is consistent with a low correlation between NOF and CAB. Table 2 econometrics" that coeffi cient estimates tend to be biased toward zero. Because the estimate of  from the CAB regression requires subtracting 1 from the regression coeffi cient, it is biased toward -1. Indeed, in every case, the estimate from the NPF regression is larger (less negative) than the estimate from the CAB regression. Th us, to some extent, the truth should lie between the estimates from the NPF and CAB regressions.
Baseline Regressions
Th e estimates of in the fi rst three columns lie between the extremes of full off set, -1, and no off set, 0, of NOF by NPF. However, the bias from simultaneity may be in either direction. (See appendix 1 for a discussion of the biases based on a structural model.) We proceed next to estimates that employ instrumental variables to remove this bias.
Th e middle three columns of table 2 display regressions using fi tted values of NOF based on the "between" instruments.
7 Th e between instruments allow for diff erences in NOF policies across countries 7. Th e second-stage regressions were run separately from the fi rst-stage regressions in order to allow for autocorrelated and heteroskedastic errors. Using the instrumental variables estimator in STATA allows for coeffi cient standard errors that appropriately refl ect information from the fi rst-stage regression under the assumption of non-autocorrelated homoskedastic errors. Th e resulting coeffi cients are never signifi cantly or even noticeably diff erent from those in table 2 and the standard errors are similar.
with minimal restrictions; this uses up many degrees of freedom in the fi rst-stage regression. 8 A critical element of a good instrument set is that the additional information from the instruments (Z) relative to the other exogenous variables (X) should be substantial. As shown at the bottom of the table, the R 2 of a regression of NOF on X is 0.40, whereas the fi rst-stage regression (NOF on X and Z) has an R 2 of 0.81, implying that the instruments (Z) do have signifi cant additional explanatory power for NOF. However, there is a risk that too many instruments may over-fi t NOF, spuriously reintroducing endogenous responses to CAB and NPF.
Th e top row of the middle three columns shows that  is estimated to be closer to zero in all of the regressions using the between instruments compared the regressions without instruments. Th is suggests that the simultaneity bias is downward and that NPF does not respond very much to NOF.
Th e fi nal three columns of table 2 display regressions using "within" instruments. Th e fi rst-stage regressions show a reasonable degree of explanatory power in the within instruments while using fewer degrees of freedom than the between instruments. Th e regressions using the within instruments also show little evidence of an NPF response to movements in NOF ( is small) and thus imply a large eff ect of NOF on CAB. 9 Indeed, the positive values of in these regressions suggest that private capital follows offi cial capital rather than off setting it, but the coeffi cients are small and, at most, marginally signifi cant. Th e regressions in table 2 suggest that the close correlation of NOF and CAB in fi gure 1 may be structural.
Th e coeffi cients on the X variables all have correct signs and plausible magnitudes except for the fi scal coeffi cient, which is lower than typically estimated in previous studies. Th is probably refl ects some fi scal eff ects implicit in the other variables, including health expenditures, aging, and energy exports. It also refl ects a signifi cant degree of collinearity between FISCAL and NOF. In regressions with a more negative estimate of , the coeffi cient on FISCAL tends to be larger (as is apparent in the next table).
It is somewhat surprising that the SUR estimates of  do not lie between the estimates from the NPF and CAB regressions. Th is probably results from the lack of correction for autocorrelation in the residuals of the SUR regression. For this reason, it may be best to focus on the average of the NPF and CAB estimates. None of the above results is signifi cantly aff ected by dropping ENERGY from the X variables and OIL_SWF from the Z variables.
Overall, the baseline results suggest no signifi cant off set of NOF by NPF. Th is result implies that NOF has
a very large eff ect on CAB.
8. All countries have three, four, or fi ve observations. For countries with only three observations, the interaction term with lagged offi cial assets is dropped to prevent a spuriously close fi t.
9. Hausman tests cannot reject that NPF is exogenous with respect to NOF using either the between or within instruments. instruments it appears that a bit more than one-third of movements in NOF are off set by NPF. 10 Th is still implies a large and statistically signifi cant eff ect of NOF on the CAB. Th ere is a risk of over-fi tting NOF in the fi rst stage, as seen by the large number of fi rst-stage variables (shown in the bottom row) relative to total observations. 11 Th e within instruments are much more parsimonious, while retaining substantial marginal explanatory power, and they lead to estimates of  close to 0.
Alternate Regressions
Estimates of the fi scal coeffi cient are now somewhat larger than those in table 2. Fiscal estimates in the middle three columns are close to those estimated by Kamin and Gruber (2007) , Chinn and Ito (2008) , and Cheung, Furceri, and Rusticelli (2010) . Th e growth forecast and health expenditures data are not available for the broader country sample. In place of a growth forecast, the regression uses the lagged fi ve-year moving average of GDP growth, but it never has a signifi cant coeffi cient. All of the other coeffi cients have the correct sign and plausible magnitudes. Some of the other coeffi cients are not comparable to those in table 2 because the data are defi ned diff erently. For example, table 3 uses projected aging over 10 years whereas table 2 uses projected aging over 20 years. Also, the capital controls variable is that of Chinn and Ito (2006, updated) which was available for more countries than that of Quinn (1997, updated) . Th e coeffi cient on YPPP is smaller than in the baseline regressions, possibly refl ecting a non-linearity in the eff ect of this variable that becomes apparent when low-income countries are included in the sample. (Th e baseline sample includes almost exclusively middle-income and high-income countries.) Table 4 presents regressions using the baseline dataset at an annual frequency. Th e SUR results are not included because they do not allow for autocorrelated errors, which are statistically signifi cant with annual data. Th e negative bias in the regressions without instruments (fi rst two columns) is greater than it was using fi ve-year averaged data. Th is suggests that high-frequency fi nancial market shocks are important and that governments use NOF to off set the eff ects of such shocks on the real exchange rate and the CAB.
Using the two-stage procedure with appropriate instruments is especially important with annual data.
Th e estimates of  with between instruments are somewhat more negative than those in table 2, but they remain far from -1. Th e estimates of  using within instruments display a wide discrepancy between the NPF regression and the CAB regression, possibly refl ecting the low marginal explanatory power of the Z variables in the fi rst-stage regression. On average, they are similar to the within-instrument estimates of  in table 2.
Annual regressions on the alternate dataset (not shown) produce estimates of very close to those in Table 5 presents regressions on country averages of the data, otherwise known as "between eff ect" regressions. It is not possible to use the between instruments because they would use all available degrees of freedom. Th e instruments here are the within instruments using annual data. Th e fi tted value of NOF in the second stage is the average fi tted value for each country from the fi rst stage. Th e fi rst four columns show that the cross-country information in the baseline sample strongly suggests that there is no off set of NOF in NPF (=0) or even a small tendency of NPF to follow NPF. Th is is consistent with fi gures 2a and 2b. Columns 5 and 6 display estimates of close to 0 in the alternate dataset when instruments are used. 14 Th e estimates of are generally more negative than in the previous tables. Th ere is much more evidence of NPF off setting NOF over time than across countries. In part, this may refl ect longer lags in trade (CAB) than in fi nance (NPF) so that the eff ects of NOF on CAB through the real exchange rate are not fully captured by regressions without adjustment lags. Another concern is the very low marginal explanatory power of the fi rst-stage regressions, evidenced by the small diff erences in the R 2 s in the bottom row despite the addition of a large number of Z variables. Poor fi rst stage fi t tends to be associated with erratic estimates of . Nevertheless, in most specifi cations, the hypothesis of full NPF off set of NOF ( = -1) can be rejected.
Further Tests
Overall, the information in the data across countries, including that contained in asset stocks as well as fl ows, strongly suggests a large eff ect of NOF on CAB with very little off set from NPF. Th e information within countries over time is less informative and potentially subject to greater biases; it suggests signifi cant eff ects of NOF on both CAB and NPF.
IV. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Comparison to Results in IMF (2012)
In their pilot External Balance Assessment (EBA), staff at the International Monetary Fund (IMF 2012) fi nd that  is not signifi cantly diff erent from -1 in a regression of the form of equation 5. Th is section explores the diff erences in implementation that lead to the diff erence in this estimate.
13. If true μ=0, then NOF does not infl uence the real exchange rate. Attempting to target anything other than the equilibrium exchange rate will give rise to off setting NPF, which will cause estimated μ<1. Estimated μ=1 only if governments choose to purchase exactly as many foreign assets as the private sector would have done anyway.
14. Compared to running the fi rst-stage regression in fi ve-year averages, this approach has little eff ect on the estimates of  for the 115 country sample but yields estimates of  that are considerably closer to 0 in the baseline sample.
Th e starting point is the regression in column 4 of table 4, which has the closest specifi cation among the regressions of this paper to that used in the EBA. Th is regression is repeated in column 2 of shocks into the second-stage regression. Th e estimate of  is noticeably lower in column 4 than in column 2; however, the estimate in column 3 is not lower than that in column 1. Th e wide discrepancy between the estimates of in the NPF and CAB regressions is a warning sign that the fi tted values of NOF from the fi rst stage may be poorly estimated.
Another important diff erence in the regressions of the EBA is the use of net foreign assets (NFA) in place of net private foreign assets (NPFA) among the exogenous variables (X). 16 Th e diff erence between these is net offi cial foreign assets (NOFA), which is the cumulation of past NOF. As shown in columns 5 and 6, adding NOFA (through NFA) lowers the estimate of . In column 6 the estimate becomes insignifi cantly diff erent from -1, consistent with the EBA result. Note again the wide discrepancy between the estimates in the NPF and CAB regressions. Th e estimate of  in column 5 is signifi cantly diff erent from -1 and much closer to 0.
When NOFA is in the regression, it is not appropriate to draw the conclusion that the eff ect of offi cial asset purchases is captured entirely by the coeffi cient on NOF. Th e eff ect of NOFA on CAB and NPF refl ects the infl uence of lagged NOF, either through lagged eff ects on the exchange rate or because NOFA is eff ectively another instrument for NOF. Because the stock of NOFA is large relative to the fl ow of NOF, a coeffi cient of 0.04 implies quite a large eff ect on CAB. Th is positive eff ect should be viewed in tandem with the negative estimate of .
15. Th e fi rst-stage regressions in the EBA do not include the exogenous variables (X). Th e EBA uses the change in foreign exchange reserves in place of NOF, but this has little eff ect on the results.
16. Indeed, all previous studies, including Gagnon (2012) , use lagged NFA instead of lagged NPFA.
14 NPFA should be included in the regression because, in a growth equilibrium, countries with high private saving will run CAB surpluses so that their NPFA will grow in line with their economies. Th e argument for including NOFA relies on Ricardian equivalence-that the private sector sees through the veil of the public sector and chooses NPFA to keep NFA (which equals NOFA+NPFA) at its desired level.
It is widely agreed that households are far from fully Ricardian. Moreover, according to the foregoing argument, the eff ect of NFA should operate entirely through the net income component of the CAB. If anything, the coeffi cient on NFA in a regression of the non-income component of the CAB should be negative. 17 Th is is indeed the case for NPFA. However, the coeffi cient on NOFA in such a regression is positive. Th is result is at variance with the argument for including NOFA in the main regressions, and it suggests that there are long-lasting eff ects of NOF on trade fl ows.
Th ere are many other diff erences between the regressions of this paper and those of the EBA. 18 But the diff erences that appear to be important are (1) using NPF as well as CAB as the dependent variable;
(2) using fi ve-year average data; (3) avoiding instruments that introduce high-frequency correlations with fi nancial shocks; and (4) not including lagged NOFA among the auxiliary variables.
Capital Controls and NOF
Two recent studies fi nd eff ects of NOF on CAB that operate entirely through the presence of capital controls (IMF 2012 and Bayoumi and Saborowski 2012) . 19 Th ey include in their regressions a measure of NOF multiplied by CAPCON. Th e coeffi cient on this term is expected to be positive, because tighter restrictions on capital mobility should be associated with less of a negative response of NPF to NOF. In other words, NPF cannot move to off set NOF if capital controls prevent it.
Adding NOF×CAPCON in the instrumented regressions of tables 2 through 4 almost always results in a coeffi cient with the wrong sign that is never statistically signifi cant. However, the coeffi cient on NOF×CAPCON is positive and statistically signifi cant in a regression of equation 5 without instruments, using the alternate dataset at an annual frequency. Th is is similar to the results of Bayoumi and Saborowski (2012) . 20 As discussed above, there are strong reasons to believe that coeffi cients are biased in regressions of equations 4 and 5 without using fi rst-stage instruments, especially in annual data.
17. Th e prediction of a negative coeffi cient in a regression that excludes income fl ows from the CAB refl ects an assumption that the return to capital exceeds the growth rate. Otherwise, the world has too much capital and welfare can be improved by saving less.
18. Th ese include additional X variables in the EBA, time dummies in this paper, diff erent treatment of the euro area in the baseline dataset of this paper, and additional countries in the alternate dataset of this paper.
19. Th e fi rst paper to suggest such an eff ect is that of Reinhardt, Ricci, and Tressel (2010) , who focus on capital infl ows to developing economies. 20. It is also possible to obtain an estimate of close to -1 and a positive coeffi cient on NOF×CAPCON with fi ve-year average data in the alternate dataset using equation 5, the Schindler (2009) 
Spillovers
Apart from measurement error, the sum of all countries' CABs must equal 0. If some countries sustain positive CABs through positive NOFs, other countries must have negative CABs. Th e use of a complete set of time dummies implicitly allows for the spillover to aff ect all countries equally in proportion to their
GDP. An alternative assumption is to assume that the spillover is focused on the countries that issue the fi nancial assets being purchased.
Th e IMF reports the currency allocation of about half of the world's stock of foreign exchange reserves in its periodical, Currency Composition of Offi cial Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER). An
alternative defi nition of NOF can be based on the COFER data assuming that all reserves are allocated in the same proportion as those reported in COFER. Th is assumed allocation is applied only to the reserves component of NOF, but the reserves component is by far the most important. Purchases of dollar reserves are counted as negative offi cial fl ows for the United States, with net private fl ows increased by an equal amount. Th e same is done for the other reserve-issuing economies: the euro area, Japan, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In these alternative data, the United States has a large negative NOF, unlike that shown in fi gure 3b, refl ecting that about 60 percent of foreign exchange reserves are held in dollar based only on foreign exchange reserves, and total NFA in place of NPFA. Th e NOF×CAPCON coeffi cient is signifi cant only when instruments are not used.
assets. Th e regressions in table 2 are re-run using the alternative NOF data. In most cases, the R 2 s increase slightly, but the coeffi cients are not aff ected to any noticeable extent.
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Another alternative approach to spillovers is to assume that they are greatest where CAPCON is lowest. To the regressions of table 2 is added an interaction term consisting of (1-CAPCON) times the sum of NOF over all countries. Th e coeffi cient is expected to be negative, as global NOF spills over into the countries with the most open fi nancial markets. However, the coeffi cient always has the wrong sign and is never signifi cant.
Overall, the data are not informative on the question of how the spillovers of NOF are allocated across
countries.
NOF and FISCAL
Th ere is a moderate degree of collinearity between NOF and FISCAL, refl ecting the fact that countries with positive NOF often have budget surpluses. Nevertheless, the coeffi cients on these variables represent two diff erent eff ects: (1) the coeffi cient on NOF captures the eff ect of a balanced-budget swap of foreigncurrency assets for domestic-currency debt; and (2) the coeffi cient on FISCAL captures the eff ect of a budget surplus used to buy domestic-currency assets (or pay down domestic-currency debt). Th us, the sum of these coeffi cients captures the eff ect of a budget surplus used to buy foreign-currency assets.
Seen in this light, one would expect that the eff ect of NOF on CAB (1+) plus the coeffi cient on FISCAL (say, ) should be no greater than 1, that is, 1++< 1 or + < 0. Except for the countryaverage regressions in the baseline dataset (table 5) , this restriction almost never is violated to any appreciable extent.
One of the surprising results of this research is that budget-neutral shifts in the currency denomination of government assets have a larger eff ect, dollar for dollar, on the CAB than changes in the budget balance. (In other words, 1+> .)
V. CONCLUSION
Th is paper presents robust evidence that currency intervention, or more broadly, net offi cial purchases of foreign assets, have a powerful and sustained impact on current account (trade) imbalances. In particular, attempts by governments to prevent currency appreciation by buying foreign assets have succeeded in maintaining large current account surpluses. Th is conclusion holds even after controlling for the endogeneity of offi cial purchases with respect to exchange rates and current accounts.
21. Bayoumi and Saborowski (2012) fi nd that the United States is the principal recipient of spillovers from reserve accumulation, with some weaker evidence of spillovers into emerging-market countries with more open fi nancial markets.
Two recent papers have argued that currency intervention aff ects current account balances only in countries that restrict private capital mobility. Because the eff ect of intervention depends critically on the degree to which fi nancial markets are effi cient, the theoretical case for a connection to capital controls is compelling. Nevertheless, this paper is not able to fi nd a robust eff ect of capital controls, and it shows that the earlier results rely on data and specifi cations that are likely to yield biased estimates. Th e available measures of capital controls do not appear to be strongly correlated with market effi ciency, possibly because even the most open markets are far from being effi cient.
Th e basic parameter estimated in this paper is the extent to which private markets off set government intervention in currency markets. It is possible to get a wide range of estimates, from nearly complete off set to a small but perverse negative off set. 22 Th e most plausible estimates suggest that private fi nancial fl ows off set somewhere between 0 and 40 percent of offi cial fl ows. Because the current account balance is the sum of net private and net offi cial fl ows, the implied eff ect on the current account balance is between 60 and 100 percent of net offi cial fl ows. Th is is a much larger eff ect than is widely assumed.
22. Because "off set" is a negative concept, the corresponding range for estimates of  is -0.9 to 0.4. * denotes coefficients significant at the 5 percent level using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
1. These are cross-section regressions of net foreign assets (NFA) in 2010 on net official assets, gross government debt, lagged relative per capita GDP (YPPP), the change in old-age dependency over the previous 10 years (AGING), and capital controls (CAPCON). The official assets and government debt coefficients are shown in rows 1 and 2, respectively. Government debt is missing for some countries. * denotes coefficients significant at the 5 percent level using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors.
1. EBA instruments are a full set of country dummies, country dummies multiplied by lagged NOF, and country dummies multiplied by the US VXO index of stock market volatility.
2. This regression uses the EBA instruments. In addition, net foreign assets (NFA) are used in place of net private foreign assets (NPFA). As  ∞, the coeffi cient on u1 in equation A7 approaches -1. When  = 0, the coeffi cient is 0.
Th is supports the assertion that  in equations 4 and 5 is bounded between 0 and -1, with -1 refl ecting fully effi cient fi nancial markets and open interest rate parity, and 0 refl ecting no tendency for fi nancial markets to arbitrage expected returns across countries.
Th e structural model also provides insights as to the nature of the bias that results from regressing NPF on NOF directly. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, the bias is calculated on the assumption that there are no auxiliary variables. Under that assumption, the expected regression 30 coeffi cient is COV(NPF,NOF)/VAR(NOF), where COV denotes covariance and VAR denotes variance. the expected bias when u1 is the only shock; the third column shows the expected bias when u2, u4, or u5 is the only shock, and the fi nal column shows the bias when u3 is the only shock. NOF, NPF, and CAB are expressed in percentage points of GDP; RER is in logarithmic percentage points; and RR and RR* are in percentage points. Table A1 is based on assumed values of  = .25 and  = 2. Th e assumed value of  is consistent with a trade price elasticity of 1 and exports and imports each equal to 25 percent of GDP. Th e assumed value of  refl ects a monetary response to a nominal spending shock roughly consistent with the original rule of Taylor (1993) scaled up to be consistent with a period length of about fi ve years. 23 Th e results are not sensitive to plausible variations in the assumed values of  and.
23. In Taylor's rule, the real interest rate rises by 0.5 times the shock to nominal GDP. However, that is based on an annual rate of interest. Th e equivalent for a 5-year return would be 2.5, but that is scaled back modestly to refl ect some decay in the eff ect within the fi ve-year period. Th e true value of , shown in the fi rst column, is bounded between 0 and -1. More effi cient fi nancial markets, which are associated with larger values of , imply values of  closer to -1. For any given value of , a more aggressive response of NOF to RER (larger ) pushes  toward 0.
Th e second column shows that the bias is small when the dominant shock is that to NOF, u1, and NOF does not respond much to RER ( is small). Th is is close to the case of exogenous NOF, in which it is well known that the regression coeffi cient is unbiased.
Th e third column shows that the bias resulting from fi nancial shocks is always negative and often large. Note that all the fi nancial shocks introduce the same bias. With fi nancial shocks, it is diffi cult to disentangle the negative response of NOF to NPF from the negative response of NPF to NOF. Th e importance of private fi nancial shocks as a source of downward bias in estimating is apparent in the regression estimates that do not use fi tted values of NOF from fi rst-stage regressions.
Th e fi nal column shows that the bias from trade shocks, u3, may be large and positive when fi nancial markets are effi cient and NOF is close to being exogenous ( is small). Under these conditions, trade shocks are being fi nanced largely by NPF but NOF also moves in the same direction. Because the NOF movement is small relative to NPF, the implied coeffi cient is large. However, when NOF responds strongly to RER, this bias can turn negative, as NOF more than fully fi nances the trade shock and NPF actually moves in the opposite direction. Updated data on capital controls based on Quinn (1997) , Chinn and Ito (2006) , and Schindler (2009) were obtained from staff at the IMF.
VARIABLES
Five-Year Averages: Missing observations are allowed in either the fi rst or last year of each fi ve-year period, but if any of the middle three years is missing the fi ve-year period is set as missing. NPF: Th e sum of capital and fi nancial accounts minus NOF (IFS, ratio to GDP).
Endogenous Variables
CAB: Th e current account balance (IFS, ratio to GDP).
Exogenous Variables, X
Th ere are diff erent sets of X variables for the 40-country and 115-country datasets. Most of the concepts are the same, but the sources diff er.
NPFA: Net private foreign assets is net foreign assets (NFA) minus offi cial assets (OFFASSET) plus EXTPUBDEBT. Th e lagged value is used (ratio to GDP).
